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Mobilizing in Different Political 
Opportunity Structures
The Cases of French and British Muslims
Imène AjAlA, PhD*
Issues related to Islam in the European sphere have increasingly been at the forefront of public spaces and part of decision makers’ agendas. According to the European Union (EU) Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, the EU includes at least 13 million Muslims, repre-
senting 5 percent of Europeans.1 For Jocelyne Césari, “Muslim immigra-
tion to Europe and North America can be seen as the foundational moment 
for a new transcultural space—a space where individuals live and experience 
different cultural references and values that are now disconnected from 
national contexts and boundaries.”2 Such a transcultural space is characterized 
by the forceful emergence of a transnational religion (Islam) in a secularized 
public space (Europe).3 This situation necessarily leads to tensions; that is, Eu-
ropean Muslims experience difficult relations with their respective govern-
ments.4 The context of the “war on terror” since the attacks of 11 Sep-
tember 2001 (9/11) and the security implied have drawn additional attention 
to Muslims and their claims-making in terms of economic, political, and 
religious rights in European countries. Muslims’ integration is considered a 
challenge constructed as a confrontation between religious discourses and 
secular spaces. Of course, national differences have different effects in terms 
of the conceptualization of multiculturalism, and one can distinguish among 
them by different “philosophies of integration.”5
* The author holds a BA in political science from the Grenoble Institute of Political Studies, Grenoble, 
France, as well as an MA and a PhD in international relations from the Graduate Institute of International 
and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland. Her broad interests lie in the realms of domestic politics 
and international relations, foreign policy analysis, and multiculturalism, with a particular focus on Muslims 
in Europe.
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France and Great Britain traditionally stand for two theoretically op-
posed models of integration—assimilation and multiculturalism, respec-
tively. Each model shapes characteristics of the country’s political oppor-
tunity structure, and those same characteristics affect and constrain the 
political mobilisation (i.e., collective action) of minority groups. This com-
parative study puts forward the official conceptions of race and ethnic 
group politics in each country before addressing the emergence and develop-
ment of Muslims’ mobilisation in each country. The analysis traces the 
ways in which Muslims frame their mobilisation rhetoric and narratives in 
conformity with these conceptions. However, this study also goes beyond 
the static view, presenting the models of France and Great Britain as ideal 
types and offering evidence of the changes affecting both countries’ philoso-
phies of integration.
First the article provides an overview of both models in terms of their 
official philosophies, the supported conceptions of identities, and the im-
plied perceptions of minorities. Doing so allows consideration of the defi-
nition, measurement, perceptions, and self-perceptions of Muslim commu-
nities in both countries. The analysis then places Muslims’ mobilisation in a 
longitudinal perspective in order to highlight the metamorphosis of mo-
bilisation and its conceptions throughout the years.
Defining Muslims
Immigration in France and Great Britain
From the assumption of some form of influence and implication in the 
public sphere to the extreme idea of a Muslim lobby in France, the place of 
Muslims in that country has been viewed from different perspectives. France 
has a long relationship with Islam, notably as a result of its colonial past.6 
For at least two centuries, it has been a country of immigration.7 After 
World War II, labor market considerations ruled immigration, with labor 
migration essentially beginning in 1945. However, the need for a labor force 
did not mean that all immigrants were equally welcome. In fact, North 
African recruits were considered less desirable than their European counter-
parts.8 The larger number of immigrants first included Algerians, followed 
by Moroccans in the 1970s, and finally Tunisians. The year 1974 constituted 
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a turning point. During the oil crisis, administrative bills issued by the sec-
retary of state for immigrant workers on 5 and 19 July suspended immigra-
tion, which dropped significantly.9 Immigrant workers who initially in-
tended to go back to their home countries turned into permanent settlers, 
bringing along their families. The reunification of families soon represented 
the largest component of immigration, especially during the 1980s and until 
1993, when policy changes brought about a decrease in the absolute levels 
and proportion.10 France automatically granted citizenship to children born 
there, and this population became known as Français issus de l ’immigration 
(French resulting from immigration). Attempts to encourage immigrants’ 
return—first and foremost that of the Algerians—failed. Progressive aware-
ness that these migrants were there to stay started to emerge only in the 
1980s. Even in the 1990s, “most of those who were perceived as ‘immi-
grants’ in France were no longer immigrants.”11 They had become a perma-
nent part of the population.
Indeed, the suspension of immigration in 1974 would initiate the move 
towards higher selectivity and tighter restrictions. Though this trend would 
be accepted as a consensus by the Right and the Left, the rise of the National 
Front would soon make immigration a politically charged issue: “Thus, as 
the proportion of foreigners in the country has diminished, the salience of 
political conflict over foreigners has increased.”12 Talks about selective im-
migration started in 2006. In this respect, the Loi Hortefeux, legislation 
adopted in 2007 to tighten conditions for family reunification, represents a 
reorientation of French immigration. The pressure to expel undocumented 
immigrants has increased, and debates around immigration remain tense, as 
reflected by the controversial creation of a Ministry of Immigration, Inte-
gration, National Identity, and United Development in 2007 and the dis-
cussion about national identity that took place between November 2009 
and January 2010, stirring considerable disagreement.
Martin Schain observes that, unlike France and the United States, 
Britain is not a traditional country of immigration, having been a country 
of net emigration until well after World War II.13 In France, immigrants 
came mostly from other European countries (especially from southern 
Europe) until the 1960s, but the majority of immigrants to Britain came 
from its former colonies.14 What changed since then is that the proportion 
of immigrants from the “New Commonwealth” (essentially India and 
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Pakistan) has increased, in contrast to that from Ireland and the “Old Common-
wealth” (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand).15 Until the first Common-
wealth Immigration Act of 1962, which introduced the first restrictions, 
citizens of British colonies and of the Commonwealth could enter freely 
into the United Kingdom (UK). However Britain already had a policy in 
place for the restriction of  “nonwhite” people coming from the New Common-
wealth, even long before World War II. The relative open-door policy did 
not necessarily apply equally to all members of the Commonwealth.16 Im-
migrants from India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan arrived to work in industrial 
cities, especially in textile towns.17 As in France, Britain considered some 
immigrants less desirable than others, deeming their capacity to integrate 
weaker.18 Though the heritage of the empire entailed an expansive and multi-
cultural conception of citizenship, the accelerating flow of immigrants from 
the New Commonwealth (which has increased by about 50 percent since 
1981) and widespread anti-immigrant sentiment forced authorities to re-
define and narrow the rules for citizenship. The immigration Act of 1971, 
for example, reinforced restrictions. Thus, reunified families remain the 
largest category of immigrants.19 Moreover, in the 1990s significant Muslim 
refugee flows from Bosnia, Kosovo, and countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, 
and Somalia took place.20
A Large, Diverse, and Concentrated Community in Both Countries
France has the largest Muslim population in Europe. Determining the pre-
cise number of Muslims in that country is not an easy task since French law 
forbids ethnic statistics and political considerations can lead to overestima-
tions. Counting Muslims does not necessarily imply counting practising 
Muslims; in fact, the term primarily refers to people with a Muslim back-
ground and origins, as noted by Jonathan Laurence and Justin Vaïsse. They 
refer to Muslims as “those individuals who, by dint of their national origin 
or ancestry, are of Muslim culture or sociological background. The popula-
tion of course includes many secular-minded citizens who would object to 
being primarily classified as Muslims. In that respect, [their] book’s main 
theme is itself a concession to viewing integration problems from a religious 
perspective.”21 Although Laurence and Vaïsse recognize that their study 
“admittedly succumbs to the convenience of shorthand and so emulated the 
recent trend among policymakers and community activists,” it is difficult to 
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proceed differently, as in all ethnic studies.22 This reflects the necessity of 
using fixed categories for the sake of research.23 Therefore, the number of 
Muslims in France will differ, depending upon the criteria used for the es-
timates. The usual figure is 5 million when talking about Muslims in the 
wider sense but 220,000 for practising Muslims, understood as those who 
regularly attend the mosque.24 Distinctions made on the basis of ethnicity 
lead to the following results: 69 percent Arabs; 30 percent of Turkish, Berber, 
African, or Asian origin; and 1 percent French or European converts.25 
When it comes to national origins, Bernard Godard and Sylvie Taussig’s 
estimates are close to Laurence and Vaïsse’s: 1.5 million Algerians, 1 mil-
lion Moroccans, more than 400,000 Tunisians, nearly 340,000 sub-Saharan 
Africans, and 313,000 Turks.26 Counting Muslims is thus a challenge in 
France but not in Great Britain, where official ethnic and religious statistics 
are available.
The Office for National Statistics’ 2001 census was the first to include 
questions about religion, establishing a Muslim population of 1.6 million 
(2.7 percent of the UK’s population), compared to 71.6 percent Christians 
and 15.5 percent with no religion.27 Muslims constitute the second largest 
religious group after Christians in the UK.28 The Muslim population is 
mainly concentrated in England and Wales (hence the focus of this article 
on Muslims in Great Britain).29 The Muslim population has experienced 
rapid growth, from 21,000 in 1951 to 600,000 in 1981 and 1.6 million in 
2001.30 According to the Office for National Statistics, 2.4 million Mus-
lims live in Britain as of January 2009, and the population is growing faster 
than any other.31 Sixty-eight percent of that population is of South Asian 
origin.32 People with a Pakistani background constitute the majority 
(750,000 or 43 percent), followed by Bangladeshi (200,0000 or 17 percent), 
and Indians (150,000 or 8 percent).33 Eight hundred thousand Muslims are 
British citizens.34 In addition to South Asians, there are also Turkish, Kurdish, 
Arab, and African communities.35 The number of converts is estimated at 
10,000.36 According to Ceri Peach, “the characteristics of the British Mus-
lim population strongly reflect those of the Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and 
Indian Muslim population living in Britain, but with a significant White, 
Mixed, African, Cypriot, North African, and Middle Eastern minority.”37
The Muslim population is younger than the French general popula-
tion: people 15 to 34 years old represent 32 percent of the French general 
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population and 63 percent of French Muslims.38 Those 50 to 65 years of age 
and above represent 42 percent of the French general population and 13 
percent of French Muslims.39 Similarly, British Muslims are younger than 
all other religious groups in England and Wales.40 Ninety percent of Mus-
lims are less than 50 years old, and the national average age is 28, compared 
to the general national average of 41.41 Thirty-four percent of Muslims are 
15 years of age or younger, compared to a national average of 20 percent.42
Immigrant populations are concentrated mostly in big cities such as 
Paris, Marseille, Lyon, and their outlying suburbs. Sixty percent of all im-
migrants in France live in Paris and its surroundings (Ile-de-France region). 
Thirty-five to 40 percent of all French Muslims live in the Ile-de-France 
region, 15 to 20 percent around Marseille and Nice (Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d’Azur region), 15 percent in Lyon and Grenoble, and 5 to 10 percent 
around Lille.43 Immigration flows have determined settlement patterns in 
industrial and urban areas.44 These include, for example, the south of Alsace; 
the northern departments; areas such as Val-d’Oise, Seine-Saint-Denis, 
and Val-de-Marne; and areas around Paris such as Somme, Seine-Maritime, 
and Eure-et-Loire.45 One also finds many Muslims on the Mediterranean 
shores, especially self-declared Muslims in Hérault, Gard, and Bouches-du-
Rhône.46 Geographically, Islam in France highlights a line going through 
Le Havre-Valence-Perpignan—the exact line situating strongholds of the 
National Front vote.47
Again, as in France, early phases of settlement strongly determined 
geographical distribution of immigrants in Britain; seeking jobs, they set-
tled primarily in industrial and urban areas.48 Eighty percent of Muslims 
live in the five major conurbations of Great Britain: Greater London, West 
Midlands, West Yorkshire, Greater Manchester, and East Midlands.49 They 
represent 8.5 percent of London’s population, and a quarter of London 
Muslims live in Tower Hamlets and Newham.50 Muslims are also present 
in industrial areas: the industrial Midlands, the northern mill towns, and 
the west coast of Scotland.51 Though Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims 
show high rates of segregation, this does not mean that Muslims live in 
religiously exclusive wards.52
In sum, Muslim communities share common patterns with regard to 
demographics and settlement patterns in both countries. Such similarities 
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have roots in the colonial past of France and Britain, but, as we shall see, the 
environments in which these communities evolve are antagonistic.
Antagonistic Political Opportunity Structures
The Question of Identification and Self-Definition or the Articulation of 
Citizenship and Religion
French citizenship is conceived of as a universal identity.53 It is “a philo-
sophical concept expressed in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen in 1789, mainly inspired by universalistic ideals of freedom, legal 
equality and property, while nationality has a legal definition in the Civil 
Code.”54 Politicization of citizenship started in the 1980s. The tradition of 
jus soli has existed in France since the 1789 revolution, but a movement 
emerged in the 1980s to consider citizenship more of an active choice than 
something automatically granted to anyone who chooses to live in France. 
Legislation introduced in 1993 (Loi Méhaignerie) specified that people 
between 16 and 21 years of age should request citizenship. After the Loi 
Guigou in 1998, one could still claim citizenship when he or she reached 
16; if not, it became automatic at age 18. About 3 million Muslims in France 
are French citizens.55
Britain likely has the most liberal citizenship regime in Europe.56 
Citizens of the Commonwealth, the dependent territories, and the Irish 
Republic can vote and run for office.57 Most British Muslims are citizens, 
and 46 percent are British-born.58 For a long time, British citizenship has 
been shaped by the status of the British empire and the resulting expansive 
definition of the concept until after World War II.59 In 1948 the British 
Nationality Act gave citizens of Commonwealth countries the right to 
freely enter, work, and settle with their families in the UK as permanent 
residents.60 Since then, different, more restrictive legislative acts have rede-
fined citizenship.61 The British Nationality Act of 1981 directly addressed 
the matter. Only citizens of the UK have the right to enter, and automatic 
citizenship is restricted to children born in the UK of a British mother or 
father or of non-British parents in the UK.62 The act represented “the cul-
mination of a process of withdrawal of citizenship rights, which progres-
sively restricted citizenship to those born in UK and their direct descen-
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dants.”63 The meaning of citizenship has also changed: older generations 
are more “denizens” in the sense that citizenship is narrowly linked to their 
residence in Britain, whereas for new generations, citizenship means access 
to British identity.64 The unity of modern Britain has never been “one and 
indivisible,” as in France.65 The devolutions of some powers to regional as-
semblies of Wales and Scotland in 1997 have reinforced decentralization; a 
high degree of cultural pluralism and therefore a lack of a “common public 
culture” exist.66 Schain notes that “most self-identify as English, Scottish, 
Welch or Irish, rather than British” and that Britishness or Englishness —
understood by Yasmin Hussain and Paul Bagguley as the sharing of “some 
substantive beliefs” and the requirement of “a common public culture”—is 
not subject to consensus.67 Consequently, the multicultural character of 
British society brought by immigration is seen as an extension of diversity 
within the UK.68
As for the emergence and awareness of a community identity—more 
precisely, a specifically Muslim identity—evidence points in several specific 
directions. On the basis of polls and previous studies, Laurence and Vaïsse 
point to the emergence of a strong Muslim identity.69 In fact, Muslim iden-
tity even trumps French identity.70 Religious identity as such, however, is 
not necessarily more pronounced; rather, it refers to cultural and religious 
traditions.71 Religious self-identification and a sense of religious collective 
identity fed by integration issues have grown, as has the visibility of Islam 
on the international scene. Sixty-six percent of the French with North 
African origins declare themselves Muslims, 8 percent are Catholic, and 20 
percent have no religion.72 However, only 36 percent of people with Muslim 
background (personnes de culture musulmane) declare themselves as practis-
ing, and only 15 percent go regularly to the mosque. Religious practise also 
declines with time spent in France.73 The five daily prayers and attendance 
at the mosque are the usual criteria that distinguish practising from non-
practising believers.74 As for cultural behaviour, fasting (ramadhan) and the 
nonconsumption of alcohol are the most shared characteristics.75 The wear-
ing of the veil, despite its disproportionate coverage in the media, pertains 
to a minority of practising believers.76 Integration cannot be separated from 
the issue of Islam, independently of whether the minorities in question 
define themselves first and foremost as Muslims and independently of their 
practise.77 In this context, it seems difficult to dissociate the religious 
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variable from the ethnic Arab variable as revealed by the commonly used 
expression arabo-musulman, even if one can question the legitimacy of as-
similating all the French of African origin with Muslims. Deprivation par-
tially explains this re-Islamization process, which can be understood as “the 
process whereby French youth of African, Turkish, or Middle Eastern origin 
turn to Islam in their search for identity—and often, but not always, to a 
form of abstract and globalised Islam rather than the ‘family Islam’ of their 
parents.”78 However, even if French Muslims, like their European counter-
parts, tend to identify more strongly with their faith than does the general 
population, this does not mean that they do not also identify strongly with 
their host country—particularly true in France where 42 percent of French 
Muslims see themselves as French citizens first.79 Forty-six percent of 
French Muslims consider themselves Muslims first, whereas this propor-
tion reaches 81 percent for British Muslims.80
Religion is also very significant to British Muslims, for whom Muslim 
identity is more important than British identity.81 During the campaign for 
inclusion of the religious question in the 2001 census, the Muslim Council 
of Britain (MCB) repeatedly emphasized that “British Muslims identify 
themselves on the basis of faith not ethnicity.”82 A range of surveys confirms 
this tendency.83 In 2006 Islamic identity was the strongest among British 
Muslims in Europe, 81 percent of them identifying themselves as Muslims 
first rather than British. The figure for French Muslims is 46 percent, 69 
percent for Spanish Muslims, and 66 percent for German Muslims.84
Contrary to French politics, which regards religion as a private matter, 
public affairs in Britain consider it a participating force. Former prime 
minister Tony Blair remarked that “religious faith has much to contribute 
to the public sphere; is still a thriving part of what makes a cohesive com-
munity; is a crucial motivator of millions of citizens around the world; and 
is an essential if non-governmental way of helping to make society work. To 
lose that contribution would not just be a pity; it would be a huge backward 
step.”85 The question of identification is crucial regarding both divided loyalties 
and the articulation of religion and citizenship as complementary or, on the 
contrary, competing concepts.86 Transnational and local processes redefine 
identity, especially in younger generations.87 Indeed, divisions among 
British Muslims do not occur only along ethnic, national, or ideological 
divisions; generational gaps also strongly characterize the British Muslim 
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community. The re-Islamization of youth has no link to the parents’ home-
land but is defined by adherence to transnational Islam and the emergence 
of radical Islamic activism—a matter of great concern to British Muslims.88 
Conceptions of a purified Islam in the Wahhabist tradition, brought in by 
Middle Eastern religious teachers in the 1990s, filled a void created when 
young British Muslims could not identify with their parents’ (primo-
migrants) “cultural Islam.”89 This phenomenon does not necessarily suggest 
a rejection of British identity because there is an accommodation of the 
“universalism of citizenship claims with particularism of their ethnic iden-
tities”; in other words, no conflict exists between transnational Muslim 
identity and British citizenship.90 Identity is complex, plural, and composed 
of different layers—a fact especially well perceived in younger generations 
who not only consider themselves British citizens but also “members of 
religious, racial, ethnic and linguistic groups.”91 The diversity of Muslim 
organisations also entails the plurality of Muslim identity conceptions since 
“representations (that is, characterizations) of community identity are in-
variably bound up with claims to represent (speak for) a community.”92 The 
political aspects of these organizations shape their definition of identity.93
Two Antagonistic Philosophies: Assimilation versus Multiculturalism
France is the strongest representative of the assimilation model, usually 
perceived as very rigid and known to reject any recognition of groups on 
ethnic, cultural, or religious bases.94 Policies designed for economic and 
political integration, for example, will target geographical areas but never 
directly address ethnic communities. More importantly, this rejection im-
plies a form of renunciation, in the French imagined community, of the 
republican myth of integration to the nation and to the general interest.
This Jacobin obsession for national unity and “national cohesion” 
hinders any consideration of ethnicity in the social sciences.95 Such a pat-
tern is all the more striking in the French perception of the United States, 
for example, where the recognition of immigrants is tied to ethnic politics 
and the consequent public collective identities. This also results in ethnic 
lobbying, whereas in France republican individualism entails the assimilation 
of individuals and the private, not public, expression of collective identi-
ties.96 As summed up by Pierre Birnbaum, according to the French perspec-
tive, the ethnicity concept refers to ghettos and to “a fragmented nation 
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without unifying identity.”97 The French have a word for this, communau-
tarisme, which means a parallel identity defined by the belonging of a group 
at the infra- or supranational level in opposition to national identity and 
which can bring about a fragmentation of the public space.98 Any recogni-
tion of the de facto multiculturalism of French society can also lead to ac-
cusations of fomenting fragmentation of the nation.99 These paradigms 
have concrete effects in that the collection of ethnic statistics, defined as 
“data of a personal nature showing, directly or indirectly, racial or ethnic 
origins,” is forbidden by French law, mentioned above.100
Despite the official discourse, a process of ethnicization of some 
debates in relation to “the second generation” has occurred.101 France is a de 
facto multicultural country, and public authorities have become increasingly 
aware of this characteristic of French society.102 In fact, according to Catherine 
Wihtol de Wenden, “multiculturalism has acquired some legitimacy under 
the pressure of immigration, of Europe and of globalisation, but also from 
the desire to assert the weight of local cultures in the patrimony of national 
culture.”103 The EU has already contested some of the principles of repub-
lican individualism through the institution of European citizenship and 
antidiscriminatory directives.104 It played an important role in change, es-
pecially via directives in 2001 and 2002 that banned discrimination in em-
ployment and housing.105
The debate over ethnic statistics and the ensuing official codification of 
identities in ethnic categories by the state reflects different approaches to 
social realities in France. In 2006 the Centre of Analytical Strategies (a 
public institution) organised a colloquium on ethnic statistics, and Minister 
of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy opened the debate by stating his favourable 
position regarding affirmative action (discrimination positive) and his sup-
port for ethnic statistics, contrary to the position of President Jacques 
Chirac and Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin. It is interesting to note 
that positions on this issue are not divided along partisan lines. The com-
munity of statisticians is strongly divided with regard to the introduction of 
ethnic statistics as well.106 The main problem concerns finding a way to 
treat ethnicity objectively.107 The issue touches not only upon measuring 
issues but also upon the final use of the data.108
Thus, we do not necessarily dispose of estimates, but the absence of 
official, state-sponsored statistics does say a a great deal about the institu-
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tional context in terms of political opportunity and the expression of private 
interests. The first general data including parents’ place of birth became 
available in 1999, with the release of the survey “Etude de l’Histoire Famil-
iale” (Studies on family history).
Since then, surveys have included more questions related to parents’ 
place of birth. Only the collecting of data on the actual nationality and 
place of birth of an individual and of his or her parents was authorised. As 
a result, evidently no “transfer” of this Anglo-Saxon concept could occur, 
especially if it entailed using a narrow conception of ethnicity as dictated by 
the republican myth of equality (i.e., reduced to the claims making of a 
specific identity in the public space).109 In fact, a more appropriate defini-
tion of ethnicity would address all groups that are a “minority in respect to 
the national context.”110 Such a definition would serve as a reminder that 
ethnicity is a wide concept that can apply to all countries.
Republican blindness to the recognition of ethnic minorities weighs 
heavily on state policies connected to religious and ethnic communities and 
explains the growing debate regarding the possibility of ethnic statistics. 
The emphasis on discrimination and employment issues is thus symptom-
atic of a move towards a focus on ethnic integration typical of multicultur-
alism, but a multiculturalism that seeks to avoid dispersion.111 The consen-
sus about the need for equal institutional religious representation and for 
frameworks dealing with racism and discrimination issues has slowly 
emerged. The picture, as it “evolves,” is then more nuanced than the typical 
“color-blind” republic image.112 Still, Wihtol de Wenden concludes that 
“the difficulty that collective identities have in defining themselves in the 
face of republican values shows that French political space is poorly inte-
grated and scarcely permits the emergence of communitarian groups. Multi-
culturalism has a long way to go in order to be more explicit and acquire full 
legitimacy.”113 Britain has chosen multiculturalism—a choice more and 
more contested these last years, especially since the riots in several cities in 
2001 and the terrorist attacks in London during 2005.114 Multiculturalism 
emerged at a time when “Britishness” itself had to be redefined after the end 
of the empire.115 British authorities favoured a race relations approach to 
the problem of integration that emerged in the 1960s, and as a consequence, 
the concept of race has been used since then to talk about the New Common-
wealth immigrants.116 The Commission for Racial Equality was created in 
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1965, and the first Race Relations Act of the same year constituted a first 
basis for the institutionalization of integration policies and of a policy 
framework supporting pluralism.117 The mandate of the Commission on 
Racial Equality, for example, is limited to racial, not religious, discrimina-
tion.118 The 1991 census was the first to include questions about ethnic 
groups’ membership; therefore, Muslims are seen through the prism of eth-
nicity.119 Because the race relations legislation provides protection for Sikhs 
and Jews (religious groups), Muslim organizations have exerted pressure to 
frame issues in terms of religion, especially those concerning discrimina-
tion. Those organizations specifically demand that religion be taken into 
account as a category.120 The 2001 census provided data on the basis of re-
ligion for the first time. In the 2000s, one might argue that religion has 
replaced race and ethnicity as the cutting-edge interest in minority popula-
tions.121 Muslim identity politics have shaped and have been shaped by the 
creation of a race-relations and then of a faith-relations industry.122
Multiculturalism has come under question more frequently, and the 
emphasis now resides on civic integration, shared values, and collective 
identity.123 The Cantle report, which followed riots in Bradford, Oldham, 
and Burnley in the summer of 2001, reflects this new orientation. After 
observing the segregation characterizing the places where riots had taken 
place, it recommended a greater sense of citizenship.124 A white paper pub-
lished by the Home Office in 2002, Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration 
with Diversity in Modern Britain, also reinforced this idea by tying integra-
tion to increased civic integration.125
Social unrest emerged with riots in the Notting Hill area of London 
and in Nottingham in 1958.126 Public authorities have changed the way 
they framed these riots. In the 1980s, they were considered a structural 
condition linked to discrimination, but in the 1990s, tensions with the po-
lice force, socioeconomic indicators, cultural misunderstandings, and reli-
gious differences constituted the dominant framework for understanding 
these events.127
The violent Bradford riots of 2001, provoked by the announcement of 
a march of the British National Party, had polarized the debate over Muslims’ 
integration in Britain.128 Those riots became a symbol of the limits of 
multiculturalism, and those local events were wrongly apprehended through 
national and global perspectives, systematically assigning to rioters the 
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status of spokespersons for their community.129 Official reports about the 
Bradford riots tended to avoid attempts to explain the events, emphasizing 
instead the broader issues of segregation, social cohesion, and proposals to 
instil a liberal conception of citizenship into the minds of South Asians.130 
The reassertion of national belonging over and above ethnic identity has 
remained a central theme in these reports.
Academic accounts regarding the riots highlight several factors. Some 
of them place most weight on deprivation, segregation, and the demands of 
“new generation” South Asians, yet others concentrate on long-standing 
grievances against the police and local manifestations of racism.131
The intensifying political focus on Islam may also be responsible for 
the change in political discourse in Britain from multiculturalism to social 
cohesion.132  In this regard, one can identify a growing public discussion 
regarding multiculturalism.133 The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center and, above all, the attacks on London in July 2005 constituted a 
pivotal moment, amplifying concerns and leading to questions about multi-
culturalism and the integration of Muslims perceived to be on the margins 
of the national community.134 Antiterrorism legislation has added a climate 
of fear and suspicion to issues of deprivation.135 Muslim organizations 
regard the portrayal of Muslims in the media as a continuing source of 
concern, especially the coverage related to international crises, which, to 
Muslim organizations, emphasizes extremist views that depict Muslims as 
a threat from within or as a fifth column.136 The MCB points out that “most 
British Muslims have actually been born in the UK. They are indigenous 
British citizens. There is no question of them being ‘hosted’ in any way.”137 
In fact the MCB has judged integration relatively successful.138 Trevor 
Phillips, chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality, has described 
multiculturalism as “outdated” and encouraging “separateness”—criticisms 
widely reported as a “bombshell.”139 Allegedly, he said, “What we should be 
talking about is how we reach an integrated society, one in which people are 
equal under the law, where there are some common values.”140
Therefore, if both models strongly stand as ideal types, they both expe-
rience pressure from the antagonistic model. The rigid French framework of 
assimilation has come under question, especially in the context of the EU, 
whereas the British multiculturalist model has come under attack, espe-
cially since 9/11 and even more so after the London bombings.
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Mobilisation and Institutionalisation
Political Participation
Because of data constraints, this section uses ethnically diverse candidates 
and immigrants as a proxy for French Muslims. Schain notes in his studies 
on immigrants that France consistently shows the “worst record of political 
representation.”141 People with an immigrant background are poorly repre-
sented politically. Schain specifically observes that “between 1995 and 2000: 
on average, [there were] just over 3 percent of municipal counsellors from 
ethnic communities in towns of 50,000 or more.”142 It is difficult for minority 
candidates to be appointed to political parties, in part because of the pres-
sure exerted by the National Front, but also because of more structural 
causes related to the reproduction of the political elite.143 The main parties 
remain closed to the admission of diverse candidates, as proven by the re-
sults of the legislative elections in 2007.
Candidates from minorities often present themselves as independent. 
The legislature included 123 ethnically diverse candidates out of a total of 
8,424, but only one for the Union for a Popular Movement, the right-wing 
party; two for the Union for French Democracy; and three for the Socialist 
Party. So although many ethnic minorities run for office, we rarely see them 
representing the major parties in France. The first three members of Parlia-
ment of North African origin were elected in the senatorial elections in 
September 2004.144 The three deputies from minorities in the National As-
sembly and four for the Senate produce a total of seven deputies or 0.81 
percent of metropolitan deputies with North African origins.145
The question of diversity also seems to represent a minor concern 
raised exclusively during elections. The Union for a Popular Movement, 
for example, eliminated the position of the national secretary of diversity 
after the presidential election of 2007.146 Though the Socialist Party does 
possess a national secretary of diversity, an office held by Faouzi Lamdaoui, 
the party has often alienated candidates from minorities, especially under 
Lionel Jospin’s government (1997–2002).147 Besides, the internal dynamics 
of the party at the grassroots level do not help the emergence of these 
candidates. No local section of the Socialist Party presented a minority can-
didate in the legislative elections in 2007. Then, the party had to freeze 20 
constituencies for “diversity candidates” but usually in constituencies diffi-
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cult to win. A telling example is that of Malek Boutih, sent to the fourth 
constituency of la Charente, whereas the local candidate, Martine Pinville, 
kept on running for the election.148 Additionally, Abel Djerrari, a former 
member of “France Plus,” an association for the promotion of political rep-
resentation, was a candidate for the regional elections, receiving only 0.4 
percent of the vote.149 We can only note the relative success of Mouloud 
Aounit, former president of “SOS Racisme,” who ran for the Communist 
Party, obtaining 14.3 percent of the support during regional elections of 
2004 in Seine Saint-Denis, a place with a high concentration of popula-
tions with foreign origins. Indeed, he obtained “up to one third of the vote 
in heavily Muslim neighbourhoods.”150
In sum, French political parties seem hardly interested in the question 
of diversity.151 From the minorities’ perspective, especially those who have 
recently immigrated to France, economic success is much more important 
than diversity, and elites do not necessarily invest the political field.152 
Minority candidates cover a heterogeneous population, but the situation 
can differ from one group to the other. Eric Keslassy, for example, indicates 
that political socialisation and integration are higher for the French of 
North African origin than for the French from sub-Saharan Africa because 
the North Africans have inherited political capital from the mobilisations 
of the 1980s.153 Besides, investment creates strong competition among mi-
nority candidates, which makes them fight each other for offices instead of 
fighting together for more offices; in other words, there is a lack of collec-
tive mobilisation.154
Are political parties simply reflecting the French population’s prefer-
ences? Barack Obama’s election in the United States has prompted this 
question, asking whether the same thing could have happened in France. 
Diversity may represent added value during an election, especially, of course, 
concerning minority voters.155 In a 2008 poll, when asked, “Could you per-
sonally vote one day for a black candidate running for president?” 80 percent 
of the French said yes; the percentages are 72 for a candidate of Asian origin 
and 58 for one of Maghrebi origin.156 The stakes, of course, are higher in a 
real election, and some form of “reluctance” may occur.157 Furthermore, 
during 2006, polls showed that voters draw a distinction between different 
elections. That is, the proportion of French people ready to vote for a minority 
candidate in local elections can be significant, but the proportion for legis-
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lative elections, though increasing, is weaker.158 Two traits define Muslims’ 
political involvment: their relative lack of participation and their preference 
for parties on the Left.159 Both phenomena, especially the skew to the Left, 
are first and foremost driven by social and economic exclusion. When asked 
about their current lives and expectations, “French Muslims are half as likely 
as the general public to be considered thriving.”160 For Wihtol de Wenden, 
the question “How can one be French and Muslim?” remains relevant in 
political debates “although neither an Arab or ethnic vote nor a penetration 
of external allegiances can be perceived among the majority of Muslims in 
France.”161 In other words, the heterogeneity of the population also pre-
vents it from acting as a voting bloc.162 A strong consensus exists regarding 
the absence of a specifically Muslim vote.163 One can conclude that formal 
political institutions do not constitute the main instrument of mobilisation 
for Muslims. Furthermore, the constraints of the assimilation philosophy 
seem to be interiorized by Muslim political actors who do not think and 
conceive of their mobilisation as one that favours particular ethnic rights; 
on the contrary, they try to embed their rhetoric in conformity with the 
universalistic claims of the assimilation paradigm. Therefore, the philosophy 
characterizing the political opportunity structure substantially constrains 
and shapes the features of Muslim mobilisation. The same phenomenon 
happens in Great Britain but in opposite forms as the multiculturalist 
model not only admits but also calls for a religious space.
Integration into political life has proven more successful than in the 
French case.164 One can even trace participation in politics back to the 
pre–World War II period.165 Immigrant minorities represent 6.6 percent of 
the electorate.166 Political awareness has especially increased after the older 
generations’  “myth of return” lost all significance and as ethnic organisa-
tions created political awareness and emphasized the necessity to engage in 
homeland politics.167
However, as in France, nonregistration is higher among ethnic minority 
voters.168 Like their European counterparts, British Muslims vote massively 
for the Left—for the Labour Party.169 Having said that, the trend may be 
changing in favour of the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats, 
especially since the war in Iraq. One can see some success at the local level 
in that 10.6 percent of local councillors in 2001 were from ethnic minorities 
in London’s boroughs.170 In the House of Commons in 2005, 15 out of 630 
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members represented ethnic minorities.171 One can attribute this local suc-
cess to the system of designation of candidates by the Labour Party, which 
uses a ward-based system, taking advantage of the concentration of ethnic 
votes in a district and finally ensuring some level of influence over national 
representation.172
If we go back to the two strategies concerning the use of immigrants 
as a political resource or as a challenge to national identity, given their share 
in the electorate and the institutional recognition of diversity, some move 
towards the first strategy has taken place.173 This strategy of reaching out to 
ethnic voters was exemplified by the establishment of the Labour Party 
Race and Action Group in 1975 as well as the setting up of a Black and 
Asian Advisory Committee.174 Jack Straw’s message to Muslims to beware 
of “fair-weather friends” (Liberal Democrats) before the June 2004 elec-
tions has been interpreted as evidence of the Labour Party’s viewing the 
Muslim vote as crucial.175 These initiatives were not restricted to that 
party—witness the fact that the Conservative Party also established an 
Ethnic Minority Unit that helped the emergence of an Anglo-Asian Con-
servative Society. Moreover, the Anglo-West Indian Conservative Society 
later on was replaced by the One Nation Forum to recruit respective minori-
ties in the Party.176 The Liberal Democrats also set up the Asian Liberal 
Democrats in 1991 as well as a forum called Ethnic Minority.177
However, two factors have limited this strategy. First, the concentra-
tion of ethnic votes is limited. Second, it often takes place in constituencies 
safe to Labour.178 The second factor concerns the relatively weak politiciza-
tion of Muslim communities in terms of civic values.179 Schain notes an 
interesting contradiction whereby French Muslims, despite their attach-
ment to civic values, are not or are rarely used as a political resource. In 
Great Britain, however, where Muslims show a deeper attachment to 
religious rather than to national identity, they still constitute a political 
resource and have better access to political life.180
Organisation and Institutionalisation
In light of the fact that laïcité (secularism) is one of the founding principles 
of the Republic, the visible expression of Islam has presented a new chal-
lenge in recent years.181 According to the Ministry of Interior, the number 
of mosques increased from 100 in 1970 to 1,600 in 2004.182 France now has 
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about 1,700 mosques, just behind Germany, which has the most in Europe 
with 2,300.183 In Ile-de-France, there are more than 50 mosques in eight 
départements.184 Godard and Taussig put the number at more than 1,800 on 
the basis of different data from the Ministry of Interior, regional commit-
tees of the French Council for the Muslim Cult (CFCM), and regional 
studies.185 With regard to financing the mosques in France, most of the 
foreign funds for their construction and maintenance come from the Middle 
East, not from countries of origin except for the Algerian subsidy for the 
Great Mosque of Paris and salaries of imams.186 However, mosques receive 
most of their financing from the population’s contributions.187
The absence of any Islamic clergy explains in part the religion’s lack of 
organisation and the obstacles to building a strong representative entity.188 
Awareness by French authorities of a need for recognition of the Muslim 
cult came after several international events, especially the Iranian revolu-
tion.189 A driving incentive for involvement of the French state in the 
emergence of a specifically French Islam has to do with decreasing foreign 
influences and financial dependence on foreign sources.190
Several factors explain the strong involvement of foreign regimes, espe-
cially homeland countries, in matters related to Islam in France. Historically, 
French secularism and the myth of return encouraged French authorities to 
delegate all issues related to Islam to foreign regimes—done through consul-
ates and embassies.191 Other geopolitical factors, such as an increasing de-
pendency on Saudi oil, also have played a role. Thus, the Muslim World 
League opened a branch in France in 1976.192 Two factors contributed to 
French authorities’ change of mind: integration issues and the emergence of 
Islamic radicalism and security threats.193
The first significant step towards building representation for Islam in 
France was the creation of a Council for Deliberation under Minister of the 
Interior Pierre Joxe. Under Charles Pasqua, the Great Mosque of Paris be-
came the predominant interlocutor, and a charter of the Muslims’ faith was 
signed. Although the charter sought to regulate the different currents, it 
failed to federate the different associations.194  Significant progress occurred 
under Jean-Pierre Chevènement in 1999. A series of consultations began, 
resulting in both the establishment of a framework of agreement whereby 
French Islam reaffirmed loyalty to the Republic, and the rendering of deci-
sions regarding voting procedures and status of the CFCM.195 On 9 
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December 2002, the three big federations—the Great Mosque of Paris, 
the Union of Islamic Organisations in France (UOIF), and the National 
Federation of Muslims in France—signed an agreement on the compo-
sition of the CFCM.196 The first CFCM was elected in April 2003 with 
80 percent of the prayer spaces participating.197 The latest elections, won 
by the Gathering of Muslims in France, took place in June 2011.
The CFCM, which comprises regional councils, is supposed to be ex-
clusively dedicated to religious issues such as the certification of halal meat 
or organisation of the hajj.198 The creation of a French Islam also entails a 
sort of transnational mediating political role although this is not always 
explicit.199 However, the CFCM introduced substantial change—specifically, 
the representation of Islam as a cult on equal footing with other religions 
and its legal institutional status, comparable to that of the Catholic clergy, 
the Protestant Federation and the Consistory, and the representative body 
for French Jews.200
The CFCM is in fact, however, a weak body—one that has not success-
fully fulfilled its mission.201 The results are disappointing in that it has been 
dominated by well-organised and conservative Muslim groups.202 Laurence 
and Vaïsse depict the institution’s paradox, noting that it constitutes “the 
only game in town for leaders of Muslim background,” which can lead to 
even more confusion in terms of the constituency represented.203 Indeed, 
the council gives a highly visible community role to practising Muslims but 
leaves aside younger generations, as well as secular Muslims. Another reproach 
often addressed to the CFCM is the involvement of foreign regimes. Even 
in the consultation process leading to creation of the CFCM, foreign 
governments had their say.204 At the same time, the Ministry of Interior 
has been heavily involved in the composition of the governing board.
Thus institutionalisation remains based on the lowest common de-
nominator, and rivalries between federations are strong and complicated by 
foreign pressures.205 Godard and Taussig indicate that this institutionalisa-
tion led to what was supposed to be avoided: a new empowerment of foreign 
governments.206 On the contrary, for Riva Kastoryano, such institutionali-
sation and domestication in the national framework could precisely help 
contain transnational networks, which emphasize the transnational and 
deterritorialized reimagined umma (community of all Muslims). Moreover, 
they seek to shape European Muslims’ identification and type of belonging, 
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over which the state would then have no control.207 Finally, the CFCM is 
divided, the search for consensus is difficult, and when reached, it is fragile. 
The council cannot pretend to be a community spokesperson, a fact that can 
only limit “its actual influence over Islam-related policies in France.”208 
Then, in terms of influence, most forms of political organisations, including 
those based on Islam, have failed.209 Most of these groups were born in the 
1980s and tried to expand in the 1990s, but overall, an obvious crisis of 
political organisation dynamics remains. Former leaders evolved towards a 
less religious discourse in order to seek alliance with other secular move-
ments, but another tendency seeks to replace the religious discourse at its 
core.210 While leaders began to consider the secular political space, inter-
mediary leaders demobilised, leaving the basis of these movements (geo-
graphically represented by the banlieues [deprived urban areas]) without 
representation. There are, of course, exceptions such as the UOIF, which 
still mobilises although its influence is restricted to “communitarian” events. 
Though dedicated to making Islam visible in society, the UOIF is also 
affected by a crisis of militancy that can be explained by a social division. 
That is, tensions exist between institutionalisation and militants’ aspirations, 
as proven by the UOIF leadership’s refusal to publicly oppose the 2004 law 
banning head scarves in school. These failed mobilisations have left a void 
characterised by two pathological forms of political mobilisation: jihadism 
and riots (révoltes de banlieue).211 The Salafist movement emerged in reaction 
to the failure of previous movements.
The riots of 2005 proved again that the communitarian structuring of 
Muslims in France is a myth.212 Therefore, one can hardly equate the problem 
of the banlieues with Islam since even major organisations (first and fore-
most, UOIF) that had tried mediation failed. Sarkozy asked the imams to 
intervene in the riots, but they did not.213 This episode is quite telling in 
terms of the perceptions of the political elite, if not of the French popula-
tion. In fact, no community intervention has sought to regulate the crisis, 
and the dominant picture is that of an atomized/individualized population 
having strong and unsatisfied demands towards the state, which occasion-
ally leads to violent forms of mobilisation.214 In short, the French political 
opportunity characterised by the assimilation philosophy and the weight of 
Jacobinism is not favourable to the mobilisation of specific interests—even 
less to ethnic mobilisation. As to the resources of the group itself, French 
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Muslims do not constitute a homogeneous group because divisions along 
national origins trump religiosity, especially as reflected in the CFCM dys-
functions. Given the focus on foreign policy in this article, the UOIF stands 
out as the most active organisation regarding this type of issue and consti-
tutes a useful source to investigate interactions with the government con-
cerning international affairs.
A British Muslim civil society has emerged relatively recently.215 For 
Peach, British Muslims’ “social organization is conservative and family 
centred.” 216 Around 1,000 prayer spaces exist as well as informal Islamic 
law courts.217 Compared to other European Muslims, British Muslims 
have a specific relationship not only with religion but also with religious 
law—sharia law—as shown by the existence of informal courts.
The controversy over Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses constituted a 
shifting point in the emergence of a single Muslim community, its mobili-
sation, and its political assertion.218 The campaign was particularly led by 
the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA), whose head, 
Iqbal Sacranie (who later became the first head of the MCB), recognized 
the influence of the Jamaat-e-Islami party on his actions.219 The UKACIA 
took the Satanic Verses case to the House of Lords.220
However, the peaceful lobbying and search for recognition by the 
UKACIA did not function and was shadowed by the “old grassroots” 
leadership of the Bradford Council of Mosques, which resorted to violent 
protest and publicly burned Rushdie’s book.221 For Toby Archer, however, 
this event reflects more of an importation of Pakistani subcontinental 
politics.222 The episode was also significant in revealing the lack of unity 
and organization of British Muslims.223 Creation of the MCB and the 
orientation of its strategy towards political participation are perceived as 
a reaction to the failure of this confrontational Islam.224
However, the most significant breakthrough came in 1997 with the 
establishment of the MCB, an umbrella organization.225 Like its French 
counterpart the CFCM, the MCB emerged because of the need ex-
pressed by the British government for a single interlocutor representing 
British Muslims.226
Presented as the “first democratic British Muslim organisation,” the 
MCB counts more than 500 affiliated organisations and claims to chal-
lenge extremist groups.227 Its 2007–8 annual report presents the MCB as “a 
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non-partisan body,” declaring that “the Muslim interest lies in working 
with all the main political parties.”228 The MCB was designed to be an 
“integrated framework for Muslim self-expression and participation in the 
life of the country.” Towards that end, the council “will plan and conduct 
effective public campaigns on Muslim issues, encourage fuller participation 
of Muslims in public affairs and provide an informed, competent and 
authentic representation of Muslim interests at all levels.”229 Another 
Muslim organisation, Al-Mujahiroun, however, opposes efforts of the 
MCB to encourage voting and political involvement. Followers of Omar 
Bakri Mohammed (leader of Al-Mujahiroun) disrupted an election meet-
ing organized by the MCB in 2005, thus shedding light on “issues of un-
precedented importance in this election: the influence of the Muslim vote 
in marginal constituencies; and the battle within the Muslim community 
between the moderate mainstream and extremists trying to hijack the 
agenda to impose their own intolerant views on fellow British Muslims.”230
The MCB is presented in a favorable light as “a group of some 350 
affiliates formed to give Muslim views greater coherence and prominence 
in Britain”—one that “advocates ‘constructive engagement’ with the Gov-
ernment and has urged its members to use their vote as citizens to make 
their voices and concerns heard. In doing so, the council has taken an 
important step to counter the marginalisation and alienation of many 
British Muslims and to inculcate the notion that democracy is compatible 
with Islam.”231
The MCB has indeed worked with the Electoral Commission and 
mosques to encourage registration.232 In 2005, a document titled “Electing 
to Deliver” and a voter card listing 10 key issues were also prepared for the 
general election.233 MCB advertisements encouraged people to vote, and 
fringe meetings took place with the three important British parties.234 The 
MCB has systematically asked imams in mosques and leaders of organisa-
tions to reach out on the grassroots level in the context of local, national, 
and European elections.235 Prevention of the far Right’s electoral success 
also justifies the MCB strategy.236 The council issued a press release to voice 
its concern about the winning of two seats by the British National Party in 
2009 for the first time.237 The idea of “serving the common good,” which 
developed early on, lies at the core of the MCB’s mission.238 In its response 
to the report by the Conservative Party’s Group on National and Inter-
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national Security, the MCB argues that its objectives are “to collate and 
articulate Muslim opinions on prevailing issues of the day much like any 
other conceived interest group. It is not a ‘single issue group,’ nor are its 
interests confined to the members it represents. Its ethos is to work for the 
common good of all; in the belief that religion, if practised properly, can be 
a force for good in the lives of all mankind.”239 This stance also corresponds 
to the future stage identified by Sacranie, former secretary-general of the 
MCB, whereby the council would engage in issues affecting not only Muslims 
but also the entire British nation, thus leaving identity politics behind.240 
As a result, the MCB has been highlighting its partnerships with other 
organisations—for instance, with other faith communities during the cam-
paign for the question on faith in the 2001 census.241
The MCB has access to the government, as proven by  consultations 
between the two actors that have occurred on different occasions. Con-
ceived from the beginning as an organization close to the government, “the 
MCB was given a role in recommending appointments from the Muslim 
community to government advisory committees, for instance at the Foreign 
Office, and suitably moderate spokespersons for BBC programming, al-
though subsequently these privileges have been challenged.”242 The MCB 
consulted on various occasions with the government, especially after the 
9/11 attacks, to discuss various issues such as media coverage, the protec-
tion of Muslims, and, of course, foreign policy.243 Consultation meetings 
have taken place with the home office as well as Foreign and Common-
wealth Office delegations, including Muslims sent to Muslim countries.244
The government has clearly defined the MCB as an actor in the build-
ing of antiterrorist policies.245 In March 2004, in the wake of the Madrid 
bombings, Sacranie wrote to imams to encourage them to cooperate fully 
with the police.246 The MCB participated in the “Prevent Extremism To-
gether” groups set up by the Home Office, whose recommendations were 
presented in November 2005. The MCB also convened a meeting as a 
follow-up to the issue on 13 May 2006 to decide that “a steering group led 
by community organizations, which would include the MCB, as well as 
others, must work together to establish an independent and inclusive advi-
sory board to deal with specific issues related to mosques and imams in the 
UK.”247 The Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board, presented in a 
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press release as “a community-led independent body . . . to achieve the ob-
jective of self regulation,” was finally elected in May 2009.248
The MCB repeatedly presents itself as “arguably Britain’s most promi-
nent Muslim representative organisation.”249 It seems to be perceived as a 
legitimate actor. An article that appeared in 2002 referred to the council as 
“an organisation recognised by Downing Street as representative of main-
stream opinion among Islamic communities.”250 Reporting the police raid 
on the Finsbury Park Mosque that took place on 20 January 2003, another 
article refers to the MCB as “the moderate umbrella group” which often 
noted that British Muslims had been repeatedly upset by the “publicity 
given to the ‘outrageous’ statements of Abu Hamza.”251 Yet another article, 
listing some of the MCB’s demands (such as “a timetable for withdrawal 
from Iraq” or “legislation banning incitement to religious hatred”), con-
cludes that “we would not endorse all the demands. But to set them in a 
democratic, constitutional framework is the legitimate right of any religious 
or political lobby group.”252
An article titled “Anger over Forest Gate Fuels Culture of Denial for 
Muslims” describes the MCB as “the national body that purports to repre-
sent British Muslims and which is frequently consulted by Downing 
Street.”253 Jonathan Birt’s analysis of the MCB explicitly mentions the 
“government creation of a unified Muslim lobby.”254 British authorities, 
with a “hearts and minds” approach to Muslims, have been trying to engage 
with the Muslim community to prevent radicalization—but with only limited 
success.255 After the London bombings in 2005, Prime Minister Blair or-
ganized a conference to ask Muslim communities to support his strategy 
aimed at eradicating extremism, most notably the monitoring of indepen-
dent Islamic schools and the regulation of imams’ immigration flows.256 
International connections came into play during a hostage crisis when Norman 
Kember and three other people from the Christian Peacemaker Team were 
taken hostage in Iraq in November 2005.257
In terms of success or representation, Archer reckons that the strong 
links between South Asian politics and MCB leaders mean that the or-
ganisation never had full support from Muslims in Britain.258 Exactly like 
the CFCM, international connections and credentials of the leaders also 
imply a distance from younger generations. A Times article notes the MCB’s 
difficulty in representing a diverse population in terms of age and ideologies. 
MOBILIZING IN DIFFERENT POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES  73
The council tries to represent “at the same time the standpoints of older, 
more conservative Muslims in Britain, the younger, better educated genera-
tion entering the professions and the angry Muslim youths on the housing 
estates of Oldham or Bradford.”259
The MCB may be popular in many parts of the country, but some in-
dividuals are not as supportive of its goals or approaches. In the famous 
policy exchange report by Munira Mirza, a poll revealed that only 6 percent 
of polled Muslims felt that the MCB represented them and that 51 percent 
felt no organization did.260 Ziauddin Sardar, who notes the emergence of a 
new generation of people who are defining themselves both as Muslim and 
British without difficulty, criticizes traditional Muslim organisations—in-
cluding the supposedly democratic MCB—as being run by primo-migrants 
who use a traditional discourse that young people cannot understand.261 
However, the organization also depends on British-born newer generations 
representing an emerging middle class to show that it “provid[es] a non-
sectarian space for the advance of a Muslim politics of recognition.”262
Two events have made the relationship between the MCB and the 
government more difficult: Blair’s support of the war in Iraq and the London 
attacks in July 2005. Security reasons have driven this search for an inter-
locutor, reflected by the use of the MCB transnationalist networks until the 
relationship became more difficult because of the council’s opposition to the 
government’s support of American policy in Iraq.263 Moreover, the MCB has 
taken positions that have damaged its image, such as its failure to send rep-
resentatives to the Holocaust Memorial Day.264
The MCB no longer seems to be considered the principal Muslim inter-
locutor for the government. For example, Archer notes the speech made by 
Ruth Kelly of the Ministry of Communities and Local Government that 
challenges the MCB’s decision concerning the Holocaust Memorial Day 
and the more general search for alternative Muslim voices such as the Sufi 
Muslim Council, which questioned the MCB hegemony.265 Even if Muslim 
organisations believe that the effort to consult Muslims showed progress, 
concerns exist that the government was imposing leadership on the com-
munity by favouring some groups over others and that consultation was 
superficial.266 Finally, an article published in 2007 noted that “the MCB 
has lost its favoured-son position, but it is still not finished.”267 The council 
has also come under regular criticism for alleged links with extremist 
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organisations such as the Deobandis or the Jamaat-e-Islami and even for 
being a fundamentalist body.268 Ed Husain also voices this criticism in his 
book The Islamist, which considers the MCB “a front for the Jamaat-i-Islami 
and the Muslim Brotherhood.”269 An article reporting the condemnation 
by the Muslim Association of Britain (a group affiliated with the MCB) of 
the London bombings described the association as “a fundamentalist 
organisation that has been criticised for alleged links with terrorist groups 
such as Hamas.”270 A Panorama documentary broadcast on the BBC in 
2005 implies, on the basis of interviews with members of the MCB, that its 
affiliated groups adopt hard-line views and that ideology from Pakistan 
exerts an “undue influence.”271 In a response to a Channel 4 programme 
titled “Who Speaks for Muslims?,” the MCB restated its democratic struc-
ture, origins, and independence from any political party, and countered 
accusations of anti-Semitism.272 In another fierce response to Martin 
Bright’s investigation in the Observer, the MCB also attacked usual criti-
cisms concerning alleged links with the Jamaat-e-Islami party, its position 
regarding the Palestinian issue, the lack of representation, and its position 
on the Holocaust Memorial Day.273
As a result, a major part of the MCB rhetoric consists of establishing 
its legitimacy as an actor representing “mainstream” Muslims and differen-
tiating itself from fringe groups. The council has also condemned excessive 
coverage in the press of these fringe groups, pointing out that the “Finsbury 
Park (mosque) received more media coverage than all the rest put to-
gether.”274 In September 2001, “in a bid to redress the imbalance in report-
ing, the MCB wrote to the BBC, ITN and Sky urging them to give greater 
coverage to mainstream Muslim voices. The MCB also met the editors and 
senior staff from the Daily Mail, the Times, the Independent, and London’s 
Evening Standard to convey the same message.”275 Finally, Birt comments 
on the centrality of the MCB:
In the short term as least, the MCB has remained “the only show in town” in the eyes of the 
government, whether for the symbolic purposes attendant on the “politics of recognition” . . . 
or as a means to gauge Muslim reaction to impending policy, in particular to attune foreign 
policy rhetoric to Muslim sensibilities both at home and abroad. . . . Having groomed and 
promoted a unified Muslim lobby for nearly a decade, the British government depicted it as 
part of the problem when it proved insufficiently compliant.276
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Conclusion
The British structure of political opportunity characterized by multi-
culturalism as well as the recognition and endorsement of identity politics 
favours the exertion of influence by ethnic, religious, and political groups. 
As for the resources of the group itself, Muslims appear to be a relatively 
active entity, given the electoral possibilities and mobilisation in various 
organisations. It is also true that British Muslims are heterogeneous. The 
MCB stands out as the most visible organisation, especially because of its 
endorsement by the government—less because of a representative character 
still subject to question. Although a similar top-down impulsion in France 
favours creation of a representative Muslim organisation, the circumstances 
are very different. The assimilation philosophy seems to paralyse any 
mobilisation framed in ethno-religious terms, which implies a relatively 
inefficient ethno-religious presence in the public sphere.
Both environments shape the contours of actors’ potential for mobil-
ising, and—aside from the determinant philosophies of integration com-
ing under attack in both countries—this does not affect the movements 
of mobilisation, at least for now. We can expect each model’s antithesis to 
exert pressure. In other words, we can expect France’s rigid model to be-
come more and more flexible and Britain’s model to become less so. It is 
difficult to quantify or determine to what extent both models will change 
because the main structures sustaining each one are firmly anchored in 
each country’s history. The real question concerns whether the changes that 
have started to affect each model will translate into effective public policies, 
which could mean, for instance, in France, the creation of official ethnic 
statistics. In any case, in order to understand ethnic minorities in any country, 
one should look first and foremost at the characteristics of the political 
opportunity structure that will determine and affect the potential, mecha-
nisms, and forms of mobilisation.
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